View Battle of 1st Bull Run
The First Battle of Bull Run was a classical example of the triumph of reality over optimism. The newly forming armies of the Confederate States of America and the expanding volunteer forces of the United States of America met, with Federal forces advancing from Washington towards Richmond and the Confederate forces in defensive positions opposing them.
In 1861 the Confederate States of America had been created out of states that had seceeded from the Union. Both the Confederates and Union began to call up volunteers, and camps and depots sprang up around the respective capitals of Richmond and Washington. As the number of volunteers near Washington increased, there were also increasing calls for action, specifically for an offensive to capture Richmond and end the experiment with secession. In Richmond, the pressure was on to secure the borders of the new Confederacy from the Federal government. A major battle seemed inevitable.
The Confederates, made up of the Army of the Potomac under Beauregard and the Army of the Shenandoah under Johnson, were holding a defensive line, the “Alexandria line”, with the main line of defense behind a small river called Bull Run. They had 29,000 troops and 55 pieces of artillery, mostly (21,000 men) under Beauregard. The Federal army of invasion that advanced to challenge them was led by McDowell and was made up of five divisions, made up of 34,000 men and 24 pieces of artillery. Although there were a small number of regular troops in the Federal forces, the majority of troops on both sides were enthusiastic but green volunteers.
On Tuesday July 16th the Federal forces began their advance. Beauregard had learned of the proposed advance a day earlier. Advancing against very light resistance, the Federal forces reached the approaches to Bull Run late on the evening of July 17th.
On the morning of Thursday July 18th McDowell’s Federals were assembled in the vicinity of Centreville, with one division detached at Fairfax Court House to shield the right flank. The Confederates were three miles to the south. The Federal forces moved out in the morning but the lead division under Tyler was repulsed at fords guarded by a Confederate brigade under Longstreet supported by a brigade under Early. The Federal infantry had retired by 1 pm, with the afternoon spent in an artillery duel.
Over the next two days the commanders on both sides probed the enemy lines and assembled their forces. Beauregard deployed his troops along Bull Run over a twelve mile front, while McDowell had Tyler’s division to the west of Centreville along the Warrenton road, reserve divisions near Centreville and Fairfax and the rest of the army to the east of Centreville.
McDowell planned to use the troops along the Warrenton road to made a demonstration while he used two divisions under Hunter and Heintzelman to make a wide detour to the Sudley ford, where they would turn the Confederate left and separate Beauregard from Johnson. He had hoped to start this movement on the evening of July 20th but at the advice of his divisional commanders waited until the morning of the 21st.
On the morning of July 21st Federal artillery, including a 30 pound Parrott, moved forward along the Warrenton Road and opened fire at 6:30 am. The Confederate guns, being outranged, did not reply. Concerned that the Confederates might be planning to move across Blackburn’s ford, McDowell held back one of Heintzelman’s brigades. As the Union infantry advanced, they encountered Confederate infantry and a general engagement developed. The main Union force continued to march towards the Confederate flank, slowing as troops stopped to drink from Sudley ford. Noting the movement of Confederate reserves as evidenced by rising clouds of dust in the area of Manassas Junction, McDowell ordered regiments to break from the column and move forward separately at best possible speed and ordered Tyler to speed up his advance.
On the Confederate side, Beauregard had learned of the movement along the Warrenton road from his pickets and had warned his brigade commanders. As he learned of the Union advance in the early hours of the 21st, he decided that he could counter with a movement on the Union left flank, and thus ordered the Confederate right and centre to cross the river and advance on Centreville with the ambitious goal of turning the Union flank and cuttting off the retreat of the Federal army to Washington.
As these movements were proceeding, Evans on the Confederate side concluded that the attacks on his front were a feint and that the Union forces, masked by the Sudley woods, were preparing to fall on the Confederate left flank. He passed his suspicions up the chain of command and deployed troops - including Wheat’s Louisiana Tigers - to Matthews Hill. His suspicions were confirmed when the head of the Union column - a brigade under Burnside - deployed in front of Wheat’s infantry at about 10 am. Burnside’s Rhode Islanders were driven back by Wheat supported by Evans with South Carolina riflemen and artillery, but returned with artillery support. They were again driven back. but came back a third time, now reinforced with more guns, additional troops and eight companies of US Army regular infantry. Wheat had been severely wounded and taken from the field, and Evans called for help from Bee, in reserve by the nearby stone bridge. Bee took position on the Henry Hill, which commanded the stone bridge and Sudley road, along with Imboden’s battery. Bee advised Evans to retire to the Henry Hill, but Evans, unwilling to retire, requested Bee provide reinforcements. From his elevated position it could be seen that there were more and more Union troops opposing Evans, and Bee brought forward two brigades, his and Bartow’s, to support Evans. Despite coming under fire from well-handled and numerous Federal guns and from increasing numbers of Union infantry, Bee and Evans stubbornly hung on. Finally two strong brigades from Heintzelman’s division advanced on the Union right while a battery of 10-pound rifled cannon established themselves in a position to cover the Sudley road. Tyler’s division began to arrive on the field, and brigades under Sherman and Keyes moved to cross Bull Run at fords above the stone bridge, extending the Union left and overlapping Bee’s position. Bee began to retire under cover from Confederate artillery on Henry Hill, units losing cohesion as they retreated under heavy pressure from Union infantry and artillery and under the cover of Hampton’s Legion from Henry Hill.
While this was occuring, the planned Confederate flanking movement had failed to materialize. There had been problems in the transmission of orders, such that both Jones and Ewell had been waiting for orders to advance which had not arrived. On learning of the heavy firing on the left, indicating that the main Union effort was there, Beauregard and Johnson abandoned their planned offensive and quickly ordered all available forces to the Confederate left. They then rode to the left, arriving on Henry Hill as Bee and Evans commands retired in disorder. The Confederate officers moved forward to try to rally the troops, while Jackson and his brigade stood in face of the advancing Union troops and under heavy Union artillery fire.
There then ensued one of those memorable conversations that ring through the history of human conflict. Bee rode up to Jackson in despair, crying, “General, they are beating us.” Jackson calmly replied, “Then we will give them the bayonet.” Revived by Jackson’s determination, Bee rode back to his retreating troops and shouted, “Look! There is Jackson, standing like a stone wall. Rally behind the Virginians! Let us be determined to die here, and we will conquer. Follow me!” A number of his troops, hearing his words and seeing the grim dedication of Jackson’s brigade, rallied and followed Bee as he charged the Union troops advancing on Jackson’s left. Bee fell in the charge, but the name he coined - “Stonewall Jackson” - and the “Stonewall Brigade” - lived on through the Civil War and beyond.
Johnson and Beauregard worked hard to restore order on Henry Hill, Beauregard ordering the regimental colours to be displayed 40 yards to the front of the remains of Bee and Evans’ commands. A number of troops rallied to the colours and returned to the fight. As this was happening, the Union troops, who had at last cleared the slopes that Evans and Bee had denied them, crossed and began to climb the northern slope of Henry Hill. With great reluctance, Johnson rode back to hasten the flow of reinforcements. Beauregard took over command of the immediate field of battle. Placing the 49th Virginia and the 7th Georgia to the left of Jackson’s brigade and Hampton’s Legion and the 8th Virginia to the rear of Jackson, the Confederate commander prepared his 6,500 men and 13 guns to meet the oncoming Union assault.
Advancing on the Confederate lines were four Union brigades and a battalion of cavalry supported by regular army batteries commanded by Griffin and Ricketts, a total of 11,000 troops, that moved in good order up the slope of Henry Hill. The Union advance moved relentlessly forward, capturing the Robinson and Henry houses and placing the Union artillery in position to pour fire on the Confederate lines, supported by an additional three batteries firing from high ground beyond the turnpike. The Union infantry advanced under the cover of the slightly sunken Sudley road, but as they approached the Confederate lines came under heavy fire from Confederate batteries commanded by Imboden, Pendleton, Stanard, Walton and Alburtis as well as musketry from Confederate infantry. As they advanced, the Union infantry near the Sudley road were charged by two companies of Confederate cavalry under Stuart, adding to the chaos produced by the steady rain of infantry and artillery fire.
McDowell fed more troops and guns into the fray, extending his right to threaten Beauregard’s right. To counter this threat Beauregard counter-attacked on his right, using troops from Bee, Bartow, Evans and Hampton’s commands. As they struck the Union left Jackson’s brigade advanced in the centre and the 49th Virginia and 7th Georgia moved forward on the Confederate’s left. The Union attack collapsed; the Confederates cleared the top of Henry Hill of Union troops, in the process capturing Ricketts and Griffin’s batteries.
Beauregard reorganized his line of battle under heavy fire from Union batteries on high ground north of the turnpike. McDowell in turn pushed forward Howard’s brigade, that had just marched onto the field of battle. Taking advantage of ravines and the cover provided by the Sudley road, the fresh Union infantry pushed the weary Confederate battle line back, retaking the lost guns. The lost batteries became a focal point, with attacks and counter-attacks see-sawing back and forth. Using his numbers, McDowell extended his right through the woods to the west of the Sudley road, again threatening the Confederate left, while also extending his left towards Bull Run to threaten the Confederate right. It was now about 2 in the afternoon.
Most of Beauregard’s command had been fighting in scorching heat for much of the day, but despite their fatigue Beauregard not only counted on them holding on but launched a charge, counting on the steady stream of reinforcements that Johnson was feeding forward. Two of these units, the 6th North Carolina and the 18th Virginia, joined the charge, the 6th on the left and the 18th on the right. The charge rolled over the Union units, pushing them off Henry Hill for the second and last time. Although the Federal forces had been forced off the high ground, the Confederate charge had not contacted McDowell’s extended right flank. Confederate reinforcements sent forward by Johnson to reinforce the Confederate left - in terms of the 2nd and 8th North Carolina - met McDowell’s movement to his right along with the 28th Virginia and Kemper’s battery. The Confederates were able to stop the Union advance but were unable to push them back. At 3 in the afternoon the last fresh troops reached the battlefield, which was the 1,700-strong Confederate brigade of E. Kirby Smith. His troops had reached the railhead in Manassas Junction at mid-day and had been hurried the six miles to the field by staff officers. Passing through the woods to the left of the Sudley Road, the brigade emerged to the Confederate’s extreme left and, in the open fields of the Chinn farm, rained destructive fire on the Federal right, assisted by Beckham’s battery. McDowell tried to turn the Confederate right with Keyes’ brigade, but this was repulsed by Latham and Alburtis’ batteries, shored up by a mixed collection of troops from broken units collected by staff officers and hurried forward in support of the Confederate guns.
The Federal right caved in under the pressure and began to retire. The first steps backward were fairly orderly, but the retreat soon developed into a rout.